

<b>Dawn Hartley-Culp, individually and on</b>	)	Case No.
<b>behalf of all others similarly situated,</b>	)	
	)	<b>CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR</b>
Plaintiff,	)	<b>DAMAGES</b>
	)	
vs.	)	<b><u>JURY TRIAL DEMANDED</u></b>
	)	
<b>Green Tree Servicing, LLC, and Federal</b>	)	
<b>National Mortgage Association Fannie Mae,</b>	)	
	)	
Defendants.	)	
	)	
	)	
	)	

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2. The TCPA was designed to prevent calls and text messages like the ones described herein, and to protect the privacy of citizens like Plaintiff. “Voluminous consumer complaints about abuses of telephone technology – for example, computerized calls dispatched to private homes – prompted Congress to pass the TCPA.” *Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC*, 132 S. Ct. 740, 744 (2012).

3. In enacting the TCPA, Congress intended to give consumers a choice as to how corporate similar entities may contact them, and made specific findings that “[t]echnologies that might allow consumers to avoid receiving such calls are not universally available, are costly, are unlikely to be enforced, or place an inordinate burden on the consumer. TCPA, Pub.L. No. 102–243, § 11. In support of this, Congress found that

[b]anning such automated or prerecorded telephone calls to the home, except when the receiving party consents to receiving the call or when such calls are necessary in an emergency situation affecting the health and safety of the consumer, is the only effective means of protecting telephone consumers from this nuisance and privacy invasion.

Id. at § 12; see also *Martin v. Leading Edge Recovery Solutions, LLC*, 2012 WL 3292838, at\* 4 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 10, 2012) (citing Congressional findings on TCPA’s purpose).

4. Congress also specifically found that “the evidence presented to the Congress indicates that automated or prerecorded calls are a nuisance and an invasion of privacy, regardless of the type of call....” Id. at §§ 12-13. See also, *Mims*, 132 S. Ct. at 744.

5. As Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit recently explained in a TCPA case regarding calls to a non-debtor similar to this one:

The Telephone Consumer Protection Act ... is well known for its provisions limiting junk-fax transmissions. A less-litigated part of the Act curtails the use of automated dialers and prerecorded messages to cell phones, whose subscribers often are billed by the minute as soon as the call is answered—and routing a call to voicemail counts as answering the call. An automated call to a landline phone can be an annoyance; an automated call to a cell phone adds expense to annoyance.

*Soppet v. Enhanced Recovery Co., LLC*, 679 F.3d 637, 638 (7th Cir. 2012).

### **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

6. This Court has federal question jurisdiction because this case arises out of violations of federal law. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b); *Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC*, 132 S. Ct. 740 (2012).

7. Venue is proper in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Plaintiff's claims occurred in this district; Plaintiff is a resident of Monroe County, Pennsylvania, which falls within the Western District of Pennsylvania.

### **PARTIES**

8. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a citizen and resident of the State of Pennsylvania. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a "person" as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153 (10).

9. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant Green Tree is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a corporation whose State of Incorporation and principal place of business is in the State of Florida. Defendant, is and at all times mentioned herein was, a corporation and is a "person," as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153 (10). Plaintiff alleges that at all times relevant herein Defendant conducted business in the State of Pennsylvania and in the County of Monroe, within this judicial district.

10. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant Fannie Mae is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a corporation headquartered in Washington, District of Columbia. Defendant, is and at all times mentioned herein was, a corporation and is a "person," as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153 (10). Plaintiff alleges that at all times relevant herein Defendant conducted business in the State of Pennsylvania and in the County of Monroe, within this judicial district.

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**FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS**

11. At all times relevant, Plaintiff was a citizen of the State of Pennsylvania. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153 (10).

12. Defendants Green Tree is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a corporation and a “person,” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153 (10).

13. Defendants Fannie Mae is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a corporation and a “person,” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153 (10).

14. At all times relevant Defendant Green Tree and Defendant Fannie Mae conducted business in the State of Pennsylvania and in the County of Monroe, within this judicial district.

15. Beginning in or about August 29, 2013, Defendant Green Tree started calling Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in 6721, regarding a home loan not belonging to Plaintiff, on behalf of Defendant Fannie Mae.

16. From approximately August 29, 2013, onwards, Defendant placed *at least* twenty-six (26) calls to Plaintiff’s cellular phone, and left pre-recorded voice-messages for Plaintiff, requesting return calls at (904)638-3506.

17. The messages left on Plaintiff’s cell-phone were for Lee Culp; on at least one occasion, Plaintiff informed Defendant Green Tree that it was contacting *her cell*-phone, not Lee Culp, and that Defendants should immediately cease such calls; however, Defendant Green Tree continued placing such calls to Plaintiff’s cellular phone, on behalf of Defendant Fannie Mae.

18. The calls Defendant Green Tree placed to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone were placed via an “automatic telephone dialing system,” (“ATDS”) as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227 (a)(1), as prohibited by 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1)(A), or an artificial or prerecorded voice, as also prohibited by 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1)(A).

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1           19. The telephone number that Defendant Green Tree or its agents called was  
2 assigned to a cellular telephone service for which Plaintiff incurs a charge for incoming calls  
3 pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1).

4           20. These telephone calls constituted calls that were not for emergency purposes as  
5 defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1)(A)(i).

6           21. Plaintiff never provided any personal information, including her cellular  
7 telephone number to Defendant Green Tree or Defendant Fannie Mae, is not a customer of  
8 either Defendant, and has never previously contacted either Defendant in any fashion. Thus, at  
9 no time did Plaintiff provide Defendants or their agents with prior express consent to receive  
10 telephone calls from an ATDS or an artificial or prerecorded voice, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227  
11 (b)(1)(A).

12           22. These telephone calls by Defendant Green Tree, on behalf of Defendant Fannie  
13 Mae, or its agents, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1).

14  
15                           **CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS**

16           23. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself and on behalf of and all others  
17 similarly situated (“the Class”).

18           24. Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, the Class, consisting of:

19                   **All persons within the United States who received any**  
20                   **telephone call(s) from Defendant Green Tree, or its agent(s)**  
21                   **and/or employee(s), on behalf of Defendant Fannie Mae, to**  
22                   **said person’s cellular telephone, made through the use of any**  
23                   **automatic telephone dialing system, or an artificial or**  
24                   **prerecorded voice, within the four years prior to the filing of**  
25                   **the Complaint.**

26           25. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff  
27 does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in  
28 the thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in  
the expeditious litigation of this matter.

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1           26. Plaintiff and members of the Class were harmed by the acts of Defendant in at  
2 least the following ways: Defendant, either directly or through its agents, illegally contacted  
3 Plaintiff and the Class members via their cellular telephones, thereby causing Plaintiff and the  
4 Class members to incur certain cellular telephone charges or reduce cellular telephone time for  
5 which Plaintiff and the Class members previously paid, and invading the privacy of said  
6 Plaintiff and the Class members. Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged thereby.

7           27. This suit seeks only damages and injunctive relief for recovery of economic  
8 injury on behalf of the Class, and it expressly is not intended to request any recovery for  
9 personal injury and claims related thereto. Plaintiff reserves the right to expand the Class  
10 definition to seek recovery on behalf of additional persons as warranted as facts are learned in  
11 further investigation and discovery.

12           28. The joinder of the Class members is impractical and the disposition of their  
13 claims in the Class action will provide substantial benefits both to the parties and to the court.  
14 The Class can be identified through Defendant's records or Defendant's agents' records.

15           29. There is a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact  
16 involved affecting the parties to be represented. The questions of law and fact to the Class  
17 predominate over questions which may affect individual Class members, including the  
18 following:  
19

- 20           a) Whether, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, Defendant or  
21 its agents placed any calls to the Class (other than a call made for emergency  
22 purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) or to a Class  
23 member using any automatic dialing system, or an artificial or prerecorded  
24 voice, to any telephone number assigned to a cellular phone service;
- 25           b) Whether Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged thereby, and the extent  
26 of damages for such violation; and
- 27           c) Whether Defendant and its agents should be enjoined from engaging in such  
28 conduct in the future.

30. As a person that received calls from Defendant via an automated telephone dialing system without Plaintiff's prior express consent, Plaintiff is asserting claims that are typical of the Class. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class in that Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to any member of the Class.

31. Plaintiff and the members of the Class have all suffered irreparable harm as a result of the Defendant's unlawful and wrongful conduct. Absent a class action, the Class will continue to face the potential for irreparable harm. In addition, these violations of law will be allowed to proceed without remedy and Defendant will likely continue such illegal conduct. Because of the size of the individual Class member's claims, few, if any, Class members could afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein.

32. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims and claims involving violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

33. A class action is a superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Class-wide damages are essential to induce Defendant to comply with federal and state law. The interest of Class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against Defendant is small because the maximum statutory damages in an individual action for violation of privacy are minimal. Management of these claims is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties than those presented in many class claims.

34. Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole.

**FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION**  
**NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT**  
**47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.**

32. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though fully stated herein.

1           33. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and  
2 multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of  
3 the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq.

4           34. As a result of Defendant's negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq,  
5 Plaintiff and The Class are entitled to an award of \$500.00 in statutory damages, for each and  
6 every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B).

7           35. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting  
8 such conduct in the future.

9  
10                               **SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION**  
11                               **KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE**  
12                               **CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT**  
13                               **47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.**

14           36. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint  
15 as though fully stated herein.

16           37. The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and  
17 multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each and  
18 every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq.

19           38. As a result of Defendant's knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227  
20 et seq, Plaintiff and The Class are entitled to an award of \$1,500.00 in statutory damages, for  
21 each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C).

22           39. Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting  
23 such conduct in the future.

24                               **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

25           Wherefore, Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court grant Plaintiff and The Class  
26 members the following relief against Defendant:

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28       ///

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**FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION**  
**FOR NEGLIGENT VIOLATION OF THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.**

- As a result of Defendant's negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiffs seeks for themselves and each Class member \$500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B).
- Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future.
- Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper.

**SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION**  
**FOR KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATION OF THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.**

- As a result of Defendant's willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1), Plaintiffs seek for themselves and each Class member treble damages, as provided by statute, up to \$1,500.00 for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C).
- Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future.
- Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper.

**TRIAL BY JURY**

46. Pursuant to the seventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America, Plaintiff is entitled to, and hereby does demand, a trial by jury.

Respectfully submitted this February 05, 2014

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